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Abstract
This paper develops a micro-founded general equilibrium model of the nancial system
composed of ultimate borrowers, ultimate lenders and nancial intermediaries. The model is
used to investigate the impact of uncertainty about the likelihood of governmental bailouts on
leverage, interest rates, the volume of defaults and the real economy. The distinction between
risk and uncertainty is implemented by applying the Gilboa-Schmeidler (1989) maxmin with
multiple priors framework to lenders' beliefs about the probability of bailout. Events like
Lehman's collapse are conceived of as "black swan" events that led lenders to put a positive
mass on bailout probabilities that were previously assigned zero mass.
Results of the analysis include: (i) An unanticipated increase in bailout uncertainty raises
interest rates, the volume of defaults in both the real and nancial sectors and may lead to
a total drying up of credit markets. (ii) Lower exante bailout uncertainty is conducive to
higher leverage - which raises moral hazard and makes the economy more vulnerable to expost
increases in bailout uncertainty. (iii) Bailout uncertainty raises the likelihood of bubbles, the
amplitude of booms and busts as well as the banking and the credit spreads. (iv) Bailout
uncertainty is associated with higher returns' variability in diversied portfolios and systemic
risks, (v) Expansionary monetary policy reinforces those eects by inducing higher aggregate
leverage levels.
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1 Introduction
Financial sector bailouts in the US and more recently in Europe have revived the well known
dilemma between restoration of condence in the face of a panic and the costs of moral
hazard. On one hand, when a panic engulfs nancial markets, bailouts appear indispensable
in order to restore condence and prevent further collapses in the nancial system. On the
other, by subsidizing opportunistic behavior at the expense of taxpayers, bailouts encourage
excessive risk taking on the part of nancial institutions, borrowers and lenders, and plant
the seeds of the next bubble.
Dierent experts in both policymaking circles as well as in academia often nd themselves
at odds regarding the ways to handle this problem. In spite of currently ongoing reforms
in regulation this dilemma is, therefore, likely to be a central issue during the upcoming
decade. Whether, and how exactly will bailout policies be deployed in the future is largely
an open issue. However, due to the lack of consensus about the precise ways to deal with
the (exante and expost) trade-os induced by bailouts, it is extremely likely that bailout
uncertainty is likely to be non negligible in the foreseeable future. The 2008 bailout zigzags
in the US (Bear-Stern versus Lehman) and current uncertainties about the reaction of EMU
governments to potential sovereign debt problems of a large country like Spain attest to that.
This paper develops a micro-founded general equilibrium model of the nancial system
and uses it in order to investigate the impact of an increase in bailout uncertainty on nancial
markets and the real economy. It also investigates the exante, leverage expanding, moral
hazard problems created by perceived generous governmental bailout policies.
As is well known since Knight's (1921) work risk and uncertainty are distinct concepts.
Modern formulations of this distinction in the context of pecuniary returns conceptualize risk
as some measure of spread for a known distribution of the stochastic return. Uncertainty,
on the other hand, is a situation in which individuals are unsure about the probability
distribution of returns and entertain the possibility that several alternative probability
distributions have positive measure. An increase in uncertainty is then viewed as a an
enlargement of the set of plausible probability distributions with positive measure. Ellsberg
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(1961) and others have demonstrated by means of experiments that individuals are averse
to ambiguity in the sense that, other things the same, they prefer a lottery with a known
probability distribution to a lottery in which several distributions are believed to be possible.
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) (GS in the sequel) conceptualize an investor's uncertainty
by postulating that he possesses a subjective set of probability measures, or multiple priors,
over outcomes. Under several axioms they show that, if the investor is averse to ambiguity
his action is determined by the Gilboa-Schmeidler max-min ambiguity aversion criterion.
That is, for each possible action the investor assumes that the worst (by the expected utility
criterion) possible distribution will realize and chooses his action so as to attain maximum
expected utility over this set of worst outcomes.
This paper utilizes the GS notion of uncertainty and the associated max-min behavioral
criterion to analyze the impact of an increase in uncertainty about governmental bailout
policy on nancial markets, the aggregate level of credit and, through them, on the real
economy. The riskiness of bailouts at the level of an individual creditor is captured by
a binomial distribution in which conditional on default by a borrower there is a bailout
with probability, p; or there is no bailout with probability 1   p. Bailout uncertainty then
means that individuals entertain the view that several alternative binomial distributions,
each characterized by a dierent value of p possess positive mass. In this context an increase
in uncertainty means that there is an enlargement in the set of possible bailout distributions.
Prior to Lehman's collapse nancial market's beliefs about the probability of bailout have
been relatively optimistic due to Bear-Stern's bailout in March 2008 as well as to the implicit
US government guarantees of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's liabilities (Meltzer (2009)). In
terms of the GS framework this means that the family of binomial bailout distributions with
positive mass was concentrated in the relatively high range of p's.
Taleb (2007) has popularized the notion of a "black swan" event. Such an event is
perceived to have zero mass before it realizes for the rst time. However, once it realizes,
individuals assign to it (a possibly small) but positive mass. We view Lehman's collapse in
mid September 2008 as such a "black swan" event. That event, deemed unthinkable, prior
to this collapse had realized after all and this reduced the lowest perceived probability of
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bailout with positive mass.
The behavior of credit default swap (CDS) spreads during the two weeks following
Lehman's collapse provides a dramatic illustration of the sensitivity of bailout expectations
to public signals. In the aftermath of this collapse credit markets experienced substantial
waves of deleveraging, totally drying up in some cases, and both the level and variability of
CDS spreads went through the roof. Table 11 shows the behavior of Citibank's CDS spread
index during the period just preceding Lehman's default and the nal approval of the TARP
bailout package at the beginning of October 2008.
Date Event CDS Spread
13-14/9 150
15/9 Lehman les for chapter 11
16-17/9 Paulson suggests TARP to 250
Congress
18-19/9 150
22-23/9 Paulson & Bernanke address 450
Congress
24-25/9 350
29/9 Congress rejects TARP proposal Almost 450
3/10 Amended TARP approved by
Congress
5-10/10 Aftermath of approval 150
Table 1: Chronology of CDS spread around Lehman's collapse
The table demonstrates the sensitivity of the CDS spread to ongoing public signals.
In particular, following rejection of the proposed TARP bailout package by Congress in
September 2008 the CDS spread goes up and following its approval in early October it goes
down supporting the view that nancial markets participants are quite sensitive to news
about the likelihood of bailout.2 Our view is that, following Lehman's collapse and the
ensuing public debate among policymakers about the wisdom of governmental bailouts, the
lower bound on the set of binomial distributions with perceived positive mass went down,
1Source: Cochrane and Zingales (2009) .
2Following Keynes, Akerlof and Shiller (2009) attribute changes in expectations to exogenous animal
spirits. By contrast this paper takes the view that changes in expectations can be traced back to new
information in noisy but relevant public signals.
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say, from 0 to 1 (here t is the lower bound of distributions with perceived positive mass
in period t).
The analysis in the paper shows that lenders' expected utility is lower the lower is p. In
conjunction with the GS max-min criterion this increase in bailout uncertainty implies that,
once a "black swan" event like Lehman's collapse materializes, lenders become more reluctant
to lend, sending shock waves through both nancial and real markets. One objective of
the paper is to trace some of the mechanisms through which the consequent changes in
perceptions aect short term credit within the nancial system, as well as credit to the real
sector. Another related objective is to analyze the impact of expansionary monetary policy
on leverage and risk appetite. The paper's framework makes it possible to trace out both the
exante and the expost consequences of (perceived) generous bailout policies. Exante, a more
generous bailout policy increases moral hazard in all segments of the nancial system and
induces an overall expansion of credit.3 But expost the maintenance of a generous bailout
policy may become necessary just to avoid a crisis even if government no longer desires to
maintain high bailout levels.
Like Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) this paper attributes ight to quality episodes
to Knightian uncertainty. But whereas they allow uncertainty to arise from various origins we
focus on the consequences of increasing uncertainty about government bailout policy. This
makes it possible to focus the analytical discussion on bailout uncertainty as a particular
trigger for a ight to quality episode. A prominent example of such an episode is the increase
in bailout uncertainty experienced in the immediate aftermath of Lehman's collapse.
Important features of the model include:
(i) An individual tradeo between return seeking through higher levels of leverage and
higher probability of total loss at the individual level.
(ii) Exante and expost relations between the worst probability of bailout and leverage at
the aggregate level.
3Borio C. and M. Drehmann (2009) convincingly argue that such a credit buildup raises the likelihood of
a nancial crisis.
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(iii) Duration mismatches: Borrowers need nancing for two periods but get only one
period loans from nancial intermediaries in each period.
(iv) The model's focus is on the segment of the shadow banking system (like SIV and
hedge funds) in which funds are secured only for short periods. Accordingly, nancial
intermediaries are assumed to borrow for only one period.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a general overview of
the model. Sections 3, 4 and 5 introduce a typical borrower, a typical nancial intermediary
and a typical lender and characterize the optimal microeconomic behavior of each type of
agent. Government's bailout policy is specied in Section 5. General equilibrium of the
nancial system and the determination of market rates are discussed in section 6. Section 7
analyzes the impact of an exogenous decrease in perceptions about the likelihood of bailout
on nancial markets and utilizes it to explain some of the events observed following Lehman's
collapse. Section 8 discusses the exante choice of leverage by borrowers in general equilibrium
including, in particular, the impact of perceived bailout policy and the associated moral
hazard problem. Section 9 reects on the social desirability of exante commitments to a
particular bailout policy. This is followed by concluding remarks in Section 10. A central
result of the paper (implied by the discussion in sections 7 and 8 and elaborated in the
conclusion) is that higher bailout uncertainty raises the amplitude of booms and busts.
Most proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Framework
There is a large number of each of the following risk averse (identical within each group) 3
types of agents: Borrowers (B), Financial intermediaries (F) and Lenders (L) each possessing
one unit of equity capital.4 The initial masses of each type of agent are MB; ML and MF
4We use the following notational conventions: the subscript j = fB;F; Lg to a variable xjt indicates the
agent type, and subscript t = f0; 1; 2g indicates time. When the time index is omitted the variable refers to
any of the time periods between 0 and 2. Random variables are identied by a tilde on top of the variable
(e.g. eX).
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for borrowers, nancial intermediaries and lenders, respectively.5
There are 3 time periods labeled 0, 1 and 2. Only borrowers-investors have access to real
investment decisions. All such decisions are made by them in period 0 and are long term in
the sense, that once chosen, the project's size cannot be adjusted. The selected project size
is (1 + LB), where 1 is the borrower's initial equity capital and LB is the leverage he selects
to take. Only short term loans are available to borrowers with interest rates rB1 and rB2 for
loans assumed in the rst and in the second period, respectively. Interest rates on loans and
project's yields are all specied in terms of net returns.
Each borrower can get loans only from nancial intermediaries. The amount of leverage,
LB; demanded by a borrower is determined as a function of rB1 and of expected rB2, by
means of individual optimization. Each nancial intermediary can obtain short-term funds,
LF , from lenders. The intermediaries generally splits his total funds (1 + LF ) between a
fraction zF allocated to a partially diversied portfolio of loans to borrowers and a fraction
(1  zF ) allocated to a risk free asset that pays a xed interest rate rf .6 The return on the
risk free asset, rf , is determined by the monetary authority.
Financial intermediaries pay to lenders short term interest rates rL1 and rL2 in periods
1 and 2 (for loans taken in periods 0 and 1) respectively. A typical lender splits his initial
wealth of 1 between a fraction zL of funds allocated to loans to nancial intermediaries and
a remaining fraction, (1  zL), that is invested in the risk free asset. In contrast to a typical
nancial intermediary, whose portfolio of loans to borrowers is only partially diversied,
a typical lender holds his selected portion of loans to nancial intermediaries in a fully
diversied portfolio of loans.
The supply of loans to borrowers by an individual nancial intermediary and his demand
for loans from lenders, LF , are determined through the intermediary's individual optimiza-
tion as a function of the interest rates rB1, rB2 , rL1 and rL2. Those interest rates are
determined through general equilibrium competitive clearing in periods 0 and 1 respectively
5The nancial markets model in the paper can be thought of as a microfounded version of general
equilibrium approaches to monetary theory and policy (Brunner and Meltzer (1997) , Tobin (1969)).
6An intermediary's portfolio is partially diversied in the sense that only part of the idiosyncratic risk
is eliminated. By contrast in a fully diversied portfolio all idiosyncratic risk is eliminated and only the
systematic risk remains.
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in two markets within each period: The market for loans from intermediaries to borrowers
and the market for loans from lenders to nancial intermediaries.7
As elaborated in the next section, returns on real projects are stochastic and therefore
risky. They realize in period 2. A real-project yield, eYP , depends on two independent random
variables: an aggregate economy-wide shock, eYA, and a specic (idiosyncratic) shock, eYI . The
realization of the aggregate shock is not revealed prior to period 2: Although all idiosyncratic
shocks realize only in period 2, the value of this future realization becomes publicly known
for some borrowers already in period 1. Depending on the information available in period 1
borrowers can be classied to one of the following three groups: Lucky borrowers for whom
it becomes known they will get a high eYI ; unlucky borrowers for whom it becomes known
they will get a low eYI , and regular borrowers for whom no advance return information is
available in period 1. The availability of such information is important because it aects
the borrower's ability to get renancing in period 1. Since project yield is random and
borrowers have some leverage obligations they generally may default in either of periods 1
or 2. A borrower defaults in period 1 if he does not succeed in securing credit to carry over
his project on to period 2. He defaults in period 2 if the total nal project return does no
suce to service the debt incurred in the previous period.
A nancial intermediary can also default in period 1 or 2 if the principal and the interest
rate paid to him by borrowers cannot cover his obligations to lenders. When a nancial
intermediary defaults lenders lose their entire investment in this intermediary including the
principal and the interest rate. Government can possibly and selectively pay the debt of
defaulting nancial intermediaries to lenders. But governmental bailout policy is uncertain
in the Knigthian sense. More precisely, individuals entertain multiple priors about the
probability of bailout, or in the language of modern decision theory { government's bailout
policy is ambiguous.
Figure 1 presents a bird's eye view of the model's nancial system. In the gure zF and
zL represent the fractions of funds Fs and Ls allocate to risky loans, and rB and rL are the
rates paid by Bs and received by Ls respectively. eYA and eYI are aggregate and individual
7A loan carrying interest rate rt (t = 1; 2) is contracted in period t  1 and settled in period t.
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components of the total net return to a typical borrower.
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Figure 1: The nancial ows
3 The Typical Investor-Borrower (B)
This section presents the borrower's problem. First it species B's real investments oppor-
tunities and his nancial requirements in each period. It then derives conditions for his
solvency and utilizes them to characterize the optimal project's size and B's optimal lever-
age conditional on the project's characteristics (its outcomes and their probabilities) and the
cost of capital faced by him in periods 0 and period 1.
3.1 Real investment projects
All real investment made in period 0 are long term in the sense, that once chosen, the project's
size cannot be adjusted, until returns are realized in period 2. The typical investment project
yields a stochastic (net) return, eYP , which may be either positive or negative.8 All real
8Returns, whether positive or negative, are cash ows.
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projects have the same distribution of returns, and the yields of any two dierent projects
are correlated due to presence of the aggregate common component in eYP :
A project's net yield is the sum of an aggregate shock eYA and of an individual idiosyncratic
shock eYI , that is eYP = eYA + eYI : (1)
We assume, for tractability, that both the aggregate and the idiosyncratic shocks, are bino-
mially and identically distributed. That is
eY = eYA = eYI =
8<: y; Pr (y) = q y; Pr ( y) = 1  q ; (2)
where 0  y  1=2. The random variables eYA and eYI are statistically independent and the
idiosyncratic shock, eYI , is independent across projects.9 Equations (1)-(2) imply that the
distribution of eYP is
eYP =
8>>><>>>:
2y, Pr (2y) = q2
0, Pr (0) = 2q (1  q)
 2y, Pr ( 2y) = (1  q)2
:
Notice that the risk of a project is a function of y: Given two projects with identical q
a higher y implies a riskier project. By equations (1)-(2) the expected return of each of the
component shocks eYi, i = fA; Ig is
E eYi = Y i = y (2q   1) ; i = A; I:
Since the project net return is the sum of eYA and eYI , which are equal in distribution, its
expected return is
E eYP = Y P = 2y (2q   1) :
Projects must have a positive expected return to be considered; i.e. Y P > 0, which implies
that q > 1
2
.
9The cases eYA = y and eYA =  y are referred to as expansion and contraction respectively.
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Assumption 1: As of period 0 the expected return on a project is higher than the expected
cost of leverage needed to carry the project to completion in period 2. That is, the distribution
of the return, eYP ; on a typical project satises
1  (1 + rB1) (1 + reB2) <
 
1 + Y P

;
where rB1 is the interest rate paid by the borrower in period 1 and r
e
B2 is the interest rate he
expects to pay in period 2 for renancing in period 1 given the information set of period 0:
Since the minimal project size is 1 and the lowest return on a project is  2y we impose the
constraint
0  y  1
2
:
This consraint enforces limited liability by ruling out negative realizations of wealth when
there is no leverage .
3.2 Borrower0s nancial requirements
Projects are nanced by a combination of equity and of leverage supplied by nancial in-
termediaries to borrowers. In period 0, each borrower-entrepreneur owns one unit of equity
capital. The initial nancing structure (equity-1 versus leverage-LB) is chosen by each B in
period 0 along with the project's size, denoted by x. Since B's initial equity capital is 1,
x = 1 + LB. In each period loans by Fs to Bs are one period loans. Consequently, a B's
project has to be nanced by two consecutive one period loans.
In the presence of positive leverage and since projects' yields are obtained only in period
2 a B must seek renancing in period 1. Therefore he depends on the availability and the
cost of credit in period 1. If excluded from the credit market in that period he defaults and
loses the entire investment project including his equity. A borrower's nancial requirements
in period 1 are equal to the amount needed to repay the principal, LB, and period's 1 interest
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charges, rB1LB. Hence, B
0s total nancial requirements in period 1 are
FRB1 = (1 + rB1)LB| {z }
Debt service
:
When he gets credit in period 1, B's ultimate debt service in period 2 is
FRB2 = (1 + rB2)FRB1 = (1 + rB1) (1 + rB2)LB:
The borrower's cost of capital for the entire project's life (from period 0 till period 2) is
therefore
rB  (1 + rB1) (1 + rB2)  1:
We assume that when the borrower cannot obtain renancing in period 1 or cannot repay
the debt in period 2, he defaults, the project is lost and neither the borrower nor the nancial
intermediary receives any payo. Thus, due to limited liability, the amount needed to cover
losses (if any) is 0. The next section explores the borrower's solvency condition.
3.3 Borrower0s solvency conditions
3.3.1 Period 0
A borrower is able to get a loan in period 0 only if the total expected payo from his project
is higher than the total debt service liability expected for period 2, that is
LB (1 + r
e
B)  (1 + LB)
 
1 + Y P

; (3)
where reB  (1 + rB1) (1 + reB2)   1 is the expected (as of period 0) cumulated interest rate
factor over the lifetime of the project. Assumption 1 implies that this condition is satised
for all non-negative leverage levels.
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3.3.2 Period 1
Although all borrowers are identical exante (in period 0), they split into three groups in
period 1. Those groups dier in terms of the information that becomes available to markets
in that period about the realizations of their idiosyncratic shocks in period 2. In particular,
it becomes known in period 1 that a fraction, LB < q; of borrowers will have eYI = y; a
fraction UB < 1  q will get eYI =  y, and no new information is revealed in period 1 about
the remaining borrowers. We refer to those three types of borrowers as Lucky borrowers
(LB), Unlucky borrowers (UB) and Regular Borrowers (RB) respectively.
A borrower who decides to leverage his project in period 0 is solvent in period 1 if
and only if he is able to obtain the renancing required to maintain his project alive till
period 2. Financial intermediaries will oer the required credit in period 1 if and only if
the expected cash ow of the project in period 2 suces to cover period's 1 debt service.
Obviously this expected cash ow diers across borrowers' types implying that borrower of
type i = fLB;UB;RBg obtains renancing in period 1 if and only if
LB (1 + rB1) (1 + rB2)  (1 + LB)

1 + E
heYP jI1 \Bii ; i = LB;UB;RB; (4)
where I1 is the information set of period 1. Given period's 1 information
E
heYP jI1 \Bii =
8>>><>>>:
2yq; i = LB
E
heYP j I1 \BRBi = 2y (q + q1   1) ; i = RB
 2y(1  q); i = UB
; (5)
and
q1  q   LB
1  (LB + UB) 
q   LB
1   (6)
is the probability that a regular borrower will get a good draw on the idiosyncratic shock,eYI ; given the information available in period 1.10
10The reason this probability diers between periods 0 and 1 is that the realizations of eYI become known
with certainty for a fraction, , of borrowers in period 1.
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Assumption 2: The expected net return of a RB on a real project conditional on the
information in period 1 satises E
heYP j I1 \BRBi > reB:
Assumption 2 is basically an extension of Assumption 1 from period 0 to period 1.
Together those assumptions requires that, given reB; the expected net return perceived by a
regular borrower is larger than the expected cost of leverage given the information of both
periods 0 and 1. The following Lemma identies solvency conditions in period 1 for the three
types of borrowers
Lemma 1:
(i) Regular borrowers are solvent in period 1 at any level of leverage, LB; if rB2 = r
e
B2:
(ii) Lucky borrowers are solvent in period 1 at any level of leverage if 2yq > E
heYP j I1i :11
(iii) Unlucky borrowers are solvent in period 1 if and only if LB  1 2y(1 q)2y(1 q)+reB  L
1
B
Note that since 1
2
< q  1 the critical level of leverage, L1B; is positive. The lower this
critical level the wider the range of period's 0 debt for which there is a non-zero probability
that the unlucky borrower defaults in period 1. When the expected cost of capital, reB,
increases the critical level, L1B; decreases, implying that, the higher the cost of capital, the
wider is the range of leverages at which a borrower might default in period 1. Increasing
risk (measured in terms of returns' variance) has a similar eect since it decreases L1B.
12 On
the other hand, when the probability of good returns increases (i.e q increases), the critical
leverage, L1B; increases widening the range of leverages for which the probability of default
in period 1 is zero.
3.3.3 Period 2
A borrower is solvent in period 2 if the payo from his project suces to cover his debt
obligation, that is
LB (1 + rB1) (1 + rB2)  (1 + LB)

1 + eYP : (7)
11Overly strong jointly sucient conditions for this requirement are LB = UB and q > 1  q::
12It is easily checked that increasing y, while keeping the probabilities of good and bad outcomes (q and
(1  q)) unchanged, increases the project's variance without changing its expected return.
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Straightforward algebra shows that this is equivalent to the requirement that ultimate wealth,
WB(:); is non negative
WB(LB; eYP ) = 1 + eYP + eYP   rBLB  0: (8)
When the nal project's payo does no suce to cover the principal and interest rate pay-
ments the borrower defaults and loses the entire project including his initial equity. Due
to limited liability the net return on the project in this case is eYP =  1 and the nancial
intermediary who own the debt receives nothing.
Lemma 1 has shown that when period's 0 leverage is higher than some critical value the
borrower is exposed to default risk in period 1. In addition positive leverage also exposes
borrowers to default risk in period 2. The following Lemma identies regular borrower's
solvency conditions in period 2 for various realizations of total returns.
Lemma 2: If a regular borrower's ultimate return is:
(i) eYP =  2y he is solvent in period 2 if and only if LB  1 2yrB+2y  LLB;
(ii) eYP = 0 he is solvent in period 2 if and only if LB  1rB  LHB ;
(iii) eYP = 2y he is solvent in period 2 for any level of leverage.
Lemma 3: Given rB2 = r
e
B2,
(i) If an unlucky borrower (UB) has chosen L1B in period 0 he is solvent in period 1.
(ii) An UB that has chosen L1B is also solvent in period 2 if and only if there is an aggregae
expansion
(iii) A lucky borrower is always solvent in period 2.
Next, we analyze the probabilities of default in periods 1 and 2 as functions of the leverage
chosen in period 0. Since payos are discrete those relations take the form of step functions.
Proposition 1: Provided rB2 = r
e
B2; the ex-ante probabilities of default in period 1 and
in period 2 (as viewed from he vantage point of period 0) are step functions of the leverage
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chosen in period 0. The precise probabilities of defaults are:
LB Pr (D1) Pr (D2) Pr (D) = Pr (D1) + [1  Pr (D1)] Pr (D2)
LB  LLB 0 0 0
LLB < LB  L1B 0 (1  q)2 (1  q)2
L1B < LB  LHB UB (1  q)2 UB + (1  )(1  q)2
LHB < LB UB 1  q2 UB + (1  UB)(1  q2) + ((1  )2q + L) (1  q)
;
where Pr (D1) and Pr (D2) stand for default probabilities in period 1 and 2 respectively.
3.4 Borrower's optimization
Not surprisingly the individual borrower faces a tradeo between expected payo and default
probability. In the large, by raising leverage, he raises the expected value of terminal equity
but also the chances of default. By Proposition 1 the exante probability of default is a step
function of leverage. This implies that the optimal level of leverage (and by implication also
the optimal project's size) must coincide with one of the four leverage levels at the jump
points of the probability of default function. The reason is that, once leverage is extended
beyond a given jump point the probability of default remains constant as long as leverage
is not pushed beyond the next jump point. Within such an interval, raising leverage raises
the expected payo without raising the probability of default.
Hence, once leverage is raised beyond a given jump point, it is individually optimal to
push it (at least) all the way till just a tiny bit before the probability function's next jump
point. It follows that, from the vantage point of period 0, the optimal level of leverage is
either zero or one of the following three leverage levels:
LLB =
1  2y
reB + 2y
;
L1B =
1  2y (1  q)
2y (1  q) + reB
; (9)
LHB =
1
reB
:
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The borrower's utility function is piecewise linear with a penalty in the event of default.
In particular utility is linear in wealth as long as the borrower is solvent. When insolvent the
borrower is subject to a penalty that increases with the magnitude of leverage he defaults
on. Formally
u(WB; LB) =
8<: WB  0; SolvencyPBLB; Insolvency ; (10)
where WB is his period's 2 terminal wealth after servicing all debts and PB is a xed default
penalty per unpaid leverage dollar in states of insolvency. Hence, the borrower's expected
utility is
V (LB)  Eu(WB(); LB)
= [1  Pr(D j LB)]E [WB() j WB()  0]  Pr(D j LB)PBLB: (11)
Using Proposition 1 and the denition of WB() in equations (8) and (9) establishes that
B0s expected utilities at each of the ve candidates for optimal leverage (four discussed above
plus any level of leverage LmB > L
H
B ) are given by
V (LB = 0) = q
2(1 + 2y) + 2q(1  q) + (1  q)2(1  2y);
V (LLB) = q
2

1 + 2y + (2y   reB)LLB

+ 2q(1  q) 1  reBLLB ;
V (L1B) = q
2 [1 + 2y + (2y   reB)L1B] + 2q(1  q) [1  reBL1B]  (1  q)2PBL1B;
V (LHB ) = (LBq + (1  )q2)

1 + 2y + (2y   reB)LHB
  Pr D j LHB PBLHB ;
V (LmB ) = (LBq + (1  )q2) [1 + 2y + (2y   reB)LmB ]  Pr [D j LmB ]PBLmB ;
(12)
where
Pr

D j LHB
  UB + (1  )(1  q2) ;
Pr [D j LmB ]  Pr

D j LHB

+ ((1  )2q + LB) (1  q):
Let LB be the optimal level of leverage. The following proposition presents (overly
restrictive) sucient condition for LB = L
H
B .
17
Proposition 2: Provided
PB >
(LBq + (1  )q2) (2y   reB)
((1  )2q + LB) (1  q)  P
c
B;
there exists a dense set of values for the vector of parameters (q; LB; UB) ; such that 1 q;
q   LB and UB are all strictly positive but small, for which the borrower's optimal level of
leverage is LHB :
The broad intuition underlying this proposition can be appreciated by starting with
the particular case in which the unit penalty, PB, for default is zero. In this case, when
the chances of good draws at the individual level are high (q and LB are large) and the
likelihood that the borrower will be unlucky in period 1 is low (UB is small), expected
utility is monotonically increasing in leverage. As a matter of fact, given the full linearity
of the utility function in the absence of a penalty, the borrower's optimal level of leverage is
innite in this case. However, in the presence of a suciently large default penalty extending
leverage beyond LHB is not individually optimal because of the increase in the risk that the
penalty will be triggered once leverage crosses the LHB threshold.
In a broad sense the conditions in the Proposition 2 are analogous to the borrower's second
order condition (SOC) when the penalties from default rise continuously with leverage. In the
continuous case the SOC assures that, as leverage goes up, the favorable marginal impact
of higher leverage on return in good states diminishes in comparison to the unfavorable
gradual increase in the default penalty. Similarly, the conditions in Proposition 2 assure
that, as leverage rises, the marginal detrimental impact of the default penalty becomes more
important relatively to the marginal favorable eect on likely prots.
4 Financial intermediaries (Fs)
For reasons that will become apparent later it is convenient to open this section with a
forward look at the relation between various equilibrium rates of interest.
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4.1 A forward look at general equilibrium
The following proposition establishes general equilibrium relations between equilibrium in-
terest rates, rB, rF and rL.
Proposition 3: In a general equilibrium with risk aversion on the part of borrowers,
nancial intermediaries and lenders, and positive levels of leverage in both the real and the
nancial sectors, the following inequalities hold
rf  rL < rB:
4.2 The typical nancial intermediary
There is a large number of nancial intermediaries (Fs) each of which possesses one unit
of core funds consisting of a combination of equity and of long term (two periods) debt. A
typical F can also raise short term (one period) funds from lenders.13 Since the focus of this
analysis is on changes in the availability of short term credit in the face of new information,
the amount of short term leverage assumed by a typical F is determined endogenously while
the sum of equity and of long term debt is taken to be exogenous.
Total nancial resources of a typical F consist of the core funds and of short term lever-
age, LF . The nancial intermediary diversies his total resources between the risk free asset
whose rate, rf , is a policy instrument, and a risky, not fully diversied, portfolio of loans
to borrowers.14 For reasons of tractability, each F lends to only two borrowers. The frac-
tion of resources invested in the risky loan portfolio to Bs is denoted zF : Let WF be the
intermediary's terminal wealth after debt service in each period. F is solvent or insolvent
in each period depending on whether terminal wealth is non negative or strictly negative.
When solvent, F's utility is described by a CRRA utility function with a coecient; , of
risk aversion that is close to, but not quite equal to, one. This specication implies that F is
almost, but not strictly, risk neutral. When insolvent, the typical intermediary experiences
13For instance through various deposits including certicates of deposit (CDs).
14By contrast, as shown in the next section, the risky portfolio of suppliers of funds to Fs (lenders) is fully
diversied.
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a (per unit of leverage) penalty, PF : Formally
15
u (WF ) =
8<:
[WF ]
1 
1  ; when WF  0
 PFLF ; when WF < 0:
(13)
4.3 Distribution of returns, solvency and optimization
Total return to a nancial intermediary depends on the performance of the two borrowers
to whom he lends. Since borrowers are identical exante, the optimal risky portfolio of an F
consists of a fty-fty split between loans to his two debtors. If both borrowers are solvent
both of them pay the full face value, of the gross debt service and the payo (from one
unit) to F is 1 + rB. If both of them default F gets a payo of 0 on his risky portfolio.
If one borrower is solvent and the other defaults F gets the payo 1
2
(1 + rB). Obviously,
the probabilities associated with each of those three payos depend on the probabilities of
defaults of borrowers and dier between periods 0 and 1. From the vantage point of period
zero, the probability a single B defaults in period 1 , Pr (D1), is given in Proposition 1. Since
LB = L
H
B , the probability that a B is insolvent in period 1 is UB: Since the probability of
being unlucky of any borrower is statistically independent of this probability for any other
borrower, the distribution of payos faced by a typical intermediary in period 0 is given by
the following table.16
Period 1 Period 2
State Payo ( eRB) Probability Probability
Both Bs are solvent 1 + rB (1  UB)2  11 q(1  q21) + q21  12
Exactly one B is solvent 1
2
(1 + rB) 2(1  UB)UB  21 2(1  q)q1(1  q1)  22
Both Bs are insolvent 0 2UB  31 (1  q)(1  q1)2  32
(14)
Recall that q is the probability of a positive (aggregate or idiosyncratic) shock and q1,
15In spite of the fact that utility functions dier across the three types of agents we use the symbol u()
to stand for all of them in order to economize on notation. In each case the identity of the player should be
evident from the context.
16The notation bt stands for probability in time t conditional on realized borrowers' types, b.
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dened in Equation (6), is the probability of a positive idiosyncratic shock conditional on the
project type that is revealed in period 1. The last column shows the probability distribution
of period's 2 payos from loans to regular borrowers as perceived by F's in period 1.
The wealth of a typical F at the end of each period is
fWF ( eRB; LF ) = (1 + LF ) hzF eRB + (1  zF )(1 + rf )i  (1 + rL)LF ; (15)
where the distributions of eRB is given in Equation (14) and rL is the interest rate paid by a F
on its short term obligations. A representative F chooses his leverage, LF , and the fraction,
zF , of resources invested in the risky loan portfolio so as to maximize Eu(fWF ) in each of
periods 0 and 1. The following proposition presents a preliminary characterization of F's
optimal policy.
Proposition 4: Let rf < rL. Then at an optimum with positive leverage, F invests all his
resources in risky loans to Bs.
4.3.1 F's solvency condition
Proposition 4 and Equation (15) imply that F is solvent if and only if
fWF ( eRB; LF ) = (1 + LF ) eRB   (1 + rL)LF = eRB + ( eRB   rL)LF  0: (16)
Since rB > rL, F is solvent for any level of leverage, LF , when both of his borrowers are
solvent, so that eRB = 1 + rB: In the other two cases F is solvent only if LF is suciently
small. The precise solvency conditions are:
LF  1+rB1+2rL rB  LcF when eRB = 12(1 + rB)
LF = 0 when eRB = 0 : (17)
Equations (14) and (17) imply that F's probability of default is an increasing step function
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of F's leverage and that the precise functions for periods 1 and 2 are
LF Pr [Dt] ; t = 1;2
0 0
LF  LcF 1t
LF > L
c
F 2t + 3t
: (18)
Proposition 5: Provided:
(i)  is suciently small,
(ii) 1t(rBt   rLt)  (1  1t)PF > 0;
(iii) [1t(rBt   rLt)  (1  1t)PF ] (LFt   LcF ) > 2tPFLF ;
(iv) (2t=1t) is suciently small,
F's optimal leverage is
LFt=

1t
1  1t
 1

(rBt   rLt)
1 

-
1 + rBt
rBt   rLt : (19)
Here LFt; t = f0; 1g is the nancial intermediary's optimal short term leverage in periods 0
and 1.
The following proposition formulates the nancial intermediary's solvency condition. If
solvent a nancial intermediary pays the full debt service to lenders. Otherwise he defaults
and pays nothing.
Proposition 6: Provided  is suciently small the nancial intermediary is solvent if and
only if the two borrowers to whom he has lent are solvent.
Proposition 6 implies that (since LFt > L
c
F ) overly restrictive sucient conditions for
the two requirement in Proposition 5 are that 1t is suciently large and/or PF suciently
small. Next, we characterize F's optimal leverage.
Proposition 7: The optimal leverage of a typical nancial intermediary is higher
(i) the lower are the intermediary's risk aversion, , and the default penalty, PF ;
(ii) the lower the cost of borrowing, rLt;
(iii) the higher the probability, 1t; that the intermediary remains solvent,
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(iv) the higher the interest rate, rBt, paid by borrowers.
5 The representative lender and government's bailout
policy
Through pension or mutual funds the representative lender (L) splits his equity between a
fully diversied portfolio of loans to nancial intermediaries and the risk free asset.17 Since,
exante, all Fs have identical distributions of returns the optimal shares of loans to dierent Fs
are all equal. The fraction invested in the risky loan portfolio to Fs is denoted zL: The typical
lender possesses mean-variance (or Constant Absolute Risk Aversion - CARA)18 preferences
u (WL) =   1e WL ;   0; (20)
where WL is his terminal wealth in each period and  characterizes the degree of constant
absolute risk aversion.
5.1 Perceived government's bailout policy
Government may repay the gross debt owed to lenders by defaulting Fs. The perceived
probability that the debt service of a defaulting F is paid by government (a bailout) is
denoted by p: The likelihood of bailout is independent across Fs debt. In case of bailout a
lender receives the full debt service, rL. In the presence of risk but no bailout uncertainty
p is unique. We use the Gilboa Schmeidler's (1989) multiple priors framework to formalize
Knightian uncertainty.19 Accordingly, in the presence of bailout uncertainty perceptions
include the convex set of all possible binomial distributions characterized by p's that the
lenders believe to have positive mass (i.e. are considered as plausible). The lowest value of
p in the set is denoted by . As will become clear below this is also the worst plausible prior
17The lender is representative in the sense that all lenders are identical.
18See Sargent (1987) pages 154-155.
19Knightian uncertainty is also known as "ambiguity" in modern decision theory.
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from a typical lender's point of view.
The degree of uncertainty is determined by the "size" of the set of possible priors. That is,
when circumstances become more uncertain (ambiguous) the set of possible priors expands
to include priors that previously were considered implausible. Consequently, provided some
of the set enlargement is toward lower p's, the worst prior, , is revised downward.
5.2 Representative lender's returns and optimization
5.2.1 Period 0
On one period loans taken in period 0 borrowers face only idiosyncratic risk because only
individually unlucky borrowers default in period 1, implying that nancial intermediaries
who lend to them also face only idiosyncratic risk in that period. By contrast, since they
fully diversify their loans across intermediaries, lenders face no risk at all in period 0. Con-
sequently, and since lenders know from Equation (14) that only a fraction, (1  UB)2; of Fs
will be solvent in period 1, equilibrium rL1 includes a compensation for the average fraction
of unpaid debt but no compensation for variability of this fraction, since this variability
equals zero due to full diversication. Hence,
1 + rL1 =
1 + rf1
1  (1  ) [1  (1  UB)2] (21)
where (1  ) [1  (1  UB)2] is the probability that a lender loses the investment in a loan
to a single intermediary. It is obtained as the product of the probabilities of the two following
independent events: "the intermediary defaults" and "government does not reimburse the
delinquent debt to the lender". As a consequence, in period 0, lenders are indierent between
investing in the standard risk free asset at rate rf1 and between investing in loans to Fs.
5.2.2 Period 1
By contrast, in period 1, lenders face risk in loans to Fs in spite of their fully diversied
portfolios. The reason is that the returns to lenders from loans to dierent Fs are correlated
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due to the common shock, eRA, in the return to real investments of borrowers. As explained
in the previous section a nancial intermediary either pays his debt in full to lenders or fully
defaults. When F defaults on the debt service, government may or may not step in and pay
the delinquent debt service to a lender. Consequently the lender faces a binomial distribution
of returns from lending to an individual F { he either gets the full debt service, 1+ rL; (from
F or from government) or 0. Although the bailout policy of government does not aect the
binomial nature of the payos from a single F, it does alter their distribution. Since
the risky portfolio of L's contains a large number of such binomially distributed loans the
risky portfolio of Ls is normally distributed with a mean and a variance that depend on both
economic (q) and political (p) uncertainties. Details appear in the following proposition.
Proposition 8: For a given p period's 2 payo to a lender on his fully diversied portfolio
of loans, f eRL2g, is normally distributed with mean
E

f eRL2g = [p+ 12 (1  p)] (1 + rL2) = p+ q(1  q21) + q21 (1  p) (1 + rL2) (22)
and variance20
V ar

f eRL2g = (1  p)2 (1  q) (1  q1)2  q + 2qq1 + q21 (1 + rL2)2;
where
q1  q   LB
1  (LB + UB) ; (23)
and f eRL2g stands for the set of possible returns from loans to F's.
A representative L chooses the fraction, zL, of resources invested in the risky loan portfolio
to Fs so as to maximize21
E
fWL(zL) =   1

E

e 
fWL(zL) (24)
20The variance is scaled by the term (1 + rL2)
2 for reasons of space.
21The right hand side of Equation (24) is obtained by using a typical lender's utility function in equation
(20).
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in each period, where fWL(zL) = zLerL + (1  zL)rf : (25)
Proposition 9: At an individual optimum, a lender allocates the fraction
zL (;RL; q; q1) =
E

f eRLg  (1 + rf )
V ar

f eRLg (26)
of each single $ to the diversied risky portfolio of loans to Fs.22;23
5.3 Partial equilibrium comparative statics
We now investigate the impact of less generous bailouts on the size of lenders' risky portfolios
and the impact of ambiguity aversion in partial equilibrium. In the absence of bailout
uncertainty government's bailout policy is characterized by a unique perceived probability,
p, that government will pay the debt of delinquent F's to L's. A more generous (towards L's)
bailout policy is characterized by a higher p and a less generous bailout policy by a lower p.
By changing the distribution of erL the value of p aects both the mean and the variance of
lenders' risky portfolios.
Proposition 10: Holding rL2 constant a less generous bailout policy (lower p)
(i) reduces the mean return on the portfolio of loans from lenders to nancial intermediaries,
(ii) raises the covariance between any two loans in the (fully diversied) portfolio, and there-
fore, the portfolio's variance,
(iii) Both changes reinforce each other in inducing a "ight to safety" by lenders.
In the presence of uncertainty about p, and since they are averse to ambiguity in the
Gilboa-Schmeidler (1989) sense, lenders behave as if the probability of bailout is the lowest
22This approximation is accurate for a small risk premium, E (ferLg)  rf .
23An identical allocation, zL (;RL; q; q1), is obtained for constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) prefer-
ences (see Merton 1971, 1973).
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within the set of p's with positive mass (denoted ).24;25 Stated dierently, they choose the
fraction of their portfolio invested in risky loans to Fs so as to maximize expected utility
under the assumption that bailout probability is : The operational consequence of such
behavior is that p should be replaced with  in propositions 8 and 10.
Propositions 10 implies that higher bailout uncertainty has two eects: Not surprisingly
it lowers the expected return from the risky loan portfolio of lenders. More surprisingly, but
not less importantly, it raises the correlation between loans in the portfolio which implies in
turn higher variances in lenders portfolios. This result appears surprising at rst blush since
intuition may lead one to conclude that an increase in bailout probability, by decreasing the
likelihood of default, will increase the correlation between loans' returns in the portfolio. But
this intuition is mistaken. The reason is that the correlation originates uniquely from the
aggregate shock whose impact operates only through the fraction of loans in the portfolio
that are no bailed out. Since the impact of this fraction on the overall correlation diminishes
as more intermediaries are bailed out the variance goes down. Consequently, in the limit,
when bailouts are almost certain, this variance tends to zero.
Proposition 10 implies that, when due to an increase in bailout uncertainty  decreases,
lenders reduce the share of funds supplied to nancial intermediaries. This conclusion plays
an important role in the following general equilibrium sections.
Proposition 11: Provided 1+2rf  rL, L's optimal allocation to risky loans, zL (; rL; q; q1)
is increasing in rL.
It is easy to check that the sucient condition in the proposition is satised for practically
all normal levels of interest rates.
24For simplicity we use the Gilboa-Schmeidler (1989) model to capture uncertainty, however other model
of uncertainty can be incorporated into our model; Klibano, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005) or Izhakian and
Izhakian (2009a, 2009b), for example.
25Lowest in the sense that under this probability distribution expected utility attains its minimal value.
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6 General equilibrium of the nancial system
Given expectations about the future, general equilibrium of the nancial system is character-
ized by two market clearing conditions. One for credit from Ls to Fs and the other for credit
from Fs to Bs. These two conditions simultaneously determine rB and rL in each period.
In period 1, expectations about the future only involve realizations of period's 2 returns to
borrowers. As a consequence, the formulation of this equilibrium is relatively simple. But
in period 0 they also involve expectations about period's 1 market clearing values of rB and
rL in period 1 (r
e
B2 and r
e
L2). Those expectations are assumed to be model consistent in the
sense that, in period 0, nancial market participants use the information available in that
period along with their knowledge of the fact that period's 1 rates will be determined by
market clearing to derive reB2 and r
e
L2.
6.1 General equilibrium in period 0
Proposition 1 implies that a borrower is insolvent in period 1 only if he is unlucky, implying
(from the discussion in Section 4) that a nancial intermediary defaults in period 1 if and only
if at least one of his borrowers is unlucky. Being unlucky is related to B's and Fs individual
fortunes rather than to the aggregate shock. Lenders are exposed to aggregate shocks and
idiosyncratic shocks; aggregate shocks are relevant only in period 2 while idiosyncratic shocks
are fully diversied. Hence, since lenders are fully diversied and lend to Fs for only one
period, they do not face any risk in lending to them in period 0. In particular they know for
sure (from Equation (14)) that a fraction (1  (1  UB)2) of intermediaries will default in
period 1. Hence, they demand a compensation only for this known with certainty fraction
of defaults. Consequently, in period 0, rL1 is determined exogenously by the condition
1 + rL1 =
1 + rf1
1  (1  p) [1  (1  UB)2] : (27)
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Actual period's 0 equilibrium conditions in the markets for loans from Ls to Fs and from Fs
to Bs are given respectively by
MFL

F (rB1; rL1) =MLzL1; (28)
LB(rB1; r
e
B2) =
MB
(1 + rB1)(1 + reB2)  1
=MF (1 + L

F (rB1; rL1)) : (29)
They determine zL1 and rB1 as functions of rL1 and r
e
B2: Since L

B(rB1; r
e
B2) also depends on
period's 0 expectation of the cost of funds to borrowers, reB2; in the subsequent period a full
characterization of period's 0 equilibrium requires additional conditions for the determination
of reB2: Those conditions are provided by the hypothesis that, in period 0, agents form their
perceptions about reB2 and r
e
L2 by utilizing period's 1 expected market clearing conditions
given their period's 0 information. Expected period's 1 equilibrium conditions in the markets
for loans from Ls to Fs and from Fs to Bs are given respectively by
(1  UB)2MFLF (reB2; reL2) = (1 + rf1)MLzL(0; reL2; q; q1); (30)
MB
(1 + rB1)(1 + reB2)  1
= (1  UB)
24 1 + rB1 + (rB1   rL1)LF (rB1; rL1)
+LF (r
e
B2; r
e
L2)
35 : (31)
The two period's 0 market clearing conditions and the two clearing conditions expected
for period 1 jointly determine rB1, r
e
B2, r
e
L2 and zL1. This system is recursive since the last
three equations simultaneously determine the rst three variables leaving the rst equation
for the determination of zL1:
6.2 General equilibrium in period 1
The actual period's 1 market clearing conditions in the markets for loans from Ls to Fs and
from Fs to Bs are given respectively by
(1  UB)2MFLF (rB2; rL2) = (1 + rf1)MLzL(1; rL2; q; q1); (32)
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MB
(1 + rB1)(1 + reB2)  1
= (1  UB)
24 1 + rB1 + (rB1   rL1)LF (rB1; rL1)
+LF (rB2; rL2)
35 : (33)
Those equilibrium conditions determine the actual interest rates, rB2 and rL2 in period 1
for predetermined, values of rB1; r
e
B2, rL1 and of 1: Comparing z

L(0; r
e
L2; q; q1) from Equa-
tion (30) with zL(1; rL2; q; q1) from Equation (32) we note that the rst two arguments of
those functions dier. Not surprisingly the rst, which refers to the expected equilibrium,
features reL2, while the second, that refers to the actual equilibrium, features rL2. Impor-
tantly, the eective bailout probabilities, 0 and 1, dier across the expected and the actual
period's 1 equilibria. This (at this stage) notational dierence is introduced in anticipation
of the discussion in the next section that introduces an unanticipated increase in bailout
uncertainty.
7 The impact of bailout uncertainty, Lehman's collapse
and the reevaluation of systemic risks
This section considers the impact of an unanticipated increase in bailout uncertainty on
nancial markets in period 1. Recall rst that 0 is the lowest perceived bailout probability
as of period 0 for both periods 0 and 1.26 The fact that, as of period 0; nancial market
participants do not expect this probability to change in period 1 is reected in the formulation
of the expected period's 1 general equilibrium conditions for period 0 (equations (28) through
(31)).
Suppose now that, following a major indication of a shift in government's bailout policy {
like not rescuing Lehman | bailout uncertainty increases. In particular, the lowest perceived
bailout probability with positive mass decrease from 0 to 1. Proposition 10 implies that,
holding rL2 constant, this change reduces the supply of funds to Fs by Ls. Application
of comparative statics methods to period's 1 equilibrium conditions shows that this change
triggers a general equilibrium increases in both rL2 and rB2 above their expected counterparts
26More generally t stands for the lowest belief in period t about the probability of governmental bailout
in all relevant future periods.
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{ reL2 and r
e
B2. Those increases raise the fraction of defaulting borrowers in period 2 and
may, under some circumstances, lead to a total drying up of credit in period 1. The string
of propositions in this section provides a precise formulation of these and related results
Let
@LF
@rB
;
@LF
@rL
(34)
be respectively the responses of F 0s optimal leverage to changes in rB2 and in rL2 and let
@zL2
@rL
;
@zL2
@
(35)
be the responses of L0s optimal share of investments in the risky portfolio to changes in rL2
and in .
Proposition 12: Given propositions 7, 10, and 11 an increase in uncertainty about govern-
mental bailout policy, and thus a decrease in the eective probability of bailout from 0 to 1
leads to:
(i) A ight to quality by lenders ( zL2 goes down)
(ii) An increases in rL2 and rB2 above r
e
L2 and r
e
B2 respectively;
(iii) When the increase in rB2 is such that rB2 > r
e
B2 + 2y(q + q1   1)(1 + reB2); period's 1
credit is denied to both regular and unlucky borrowers, so both types of borrowers default
in period 1;
(iv) A suciently large increase in rB2 beyond r
e
B2 + 2y(q + q1   1)(1 + reB2), triggers a
total "nancial arrest" in period's 1 credit to Bs in the sense that credit is denied to all
borrowers.27
The comparative statics impacts in Proposition 12 accord well with the ight to quality
and the general increase in the cost of debt observed following the downfall of Lehman
Brothers. They are consistent with the view that much of the nancial market panic, and
the associated arrest of nancial markets, in the aftermath of this collapse was due to an
increase in uncertainty about the willingness of the US government to use public funds to
compensate creditors' for losses due to defaulting nancial intermediaries.
27This term has recently been suggested by Ricardo Caballero (2010) .
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Following the outbreak of the crisis one of the expost explanations oered for the fact
that so many market participants failed to see it coming was that they underestimated the
systemic risks due to the correlation between the returns on diernent assets. The framework
of this paper suggests that underestimation of this correlation prior to the crisis may be due
to the fact that, by proposition 10 and 12, optimistic bailout expectations are associated
with a low perceived correlation and therefore a low variance in lenders portofolios. On this
view underestimation of the covariance between returns prior to the decision not to bailout
Lehman was rational in view of the optimistic beliefs held at the time about government
bailout policy. But after Lehman's collapse uncertainty about bailout policy increased.
This led to a more pessimistic evaluation of the likelihood of bailout raising the covariance
between the returns on loans to nancial intermediaries, and with it the variance of lenders'
portofolios.
7.1 Bailout uncertainty, the banking spread and the credit spread
The banking (or intermediation) spread.is dened as the dierence between the rate, rB;
that nancial intermediaries charge to borrowers and the rate, rL; that they pay to lenders.
By changing the general equilibrium level of interest rates a change in bailout uncertainty
also changes the banking spread. The following proposition links the spread to bailout
uncertainty.
Proposition 13:
(i) Generally, depending on whether
@LF
@rB
is smaller or larger than j @LF
@rL
j; an increase in
bailout uncertainty raises or reduces the banking spread, rB2   rL2.
(ii) For the specication of intermediaries' objective function featured in this paper an in-
crease in bailout uncertainty raises the banking spread, rB2   rL2.
The credit spread is generally dened as the dierence between the yield on private debt
instruments and government securities Within the analytical frameork of this paper the
credit spread corresponds to the dierence between the rate, rL2; charged by lenders to
nancial intermediaries and the risk free rate, rf : The following corollary summarizes the
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impact of a, period's 1, increase in bailout uncertainty on the credit spread.
Corollary to proposition 12: An increase in uncertainty about governmental bailout policy
leads to an increase in the credit spread.
Interestingly, recent empirical proxies of credit spreads due to Gilchrist and Zakrajsek
(2011) show that credit spreads rose substantially during the 2007-2009 period. In particular,
the substantial increase in CDS spreads in the immediate aftermath of Lehman's collapse in
September 2008 is consistent with the view that those increases were due, in large part, to
an increase in bailout uncertainty.
8 Exante bailout perceptions and moral hazard
8.1 The impact of lower bailout uncertainty (higher 0 )
Unlike period 1 in which the demand for credit by borrowers is already predetermined,
period's 0 leverage depends on the borrowing rate in that period as well as on the borrowing
rate expected to prevail in period 1. In general equilibrium both of those rates, as well as
the rates at which nancial intermediaries borrow from lenders, depend on nancial markets
participants' perceptions about the likelihood of bailout. Hence, by aecting equilibrium
interest rates, perceptions about the likelihood of bailout in period 0 aect the volume of
leverage in nancial markets. This section investigates the impact of period's 0 permanent
beliefs about governmental bailout policy as summarized by the parameter 0 on the volume
and the cost of period's 0 loans to Bs as well as on expected future rates. By aecting interest
levels expected to prevail in period 1 the level of bailout uncertainty currently perceived for
that period aects, in turn, the volume of Bs leverage in period 0. The following proposition
presents the various impacts of 0 given, overly restrictive, sucient conditions.
Proposition 14: For model consistent expectations and provided Fs risk aversion, ; is
small, PF < 1 and (1   UB)2 (1 + rB1   rL1) > 1; higher permanent values of 0 (lower
bailout uncertainty) are associated with
(i) Overall larger levels of credit by intermediaries to borrowers.and by lenders to nancial
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intermediaries in period 0.
(ii) Lower levels of reB2 and of r
e
L2.
(iii) A higher level of rB1
The results of Proposition 14 arise through several interconnected channels. Proposition
8-10 imply that perceptions of a more generous bailout policy directly raises the fraction of
their portfolio that lenders are expected to invest in risky loans to nancial intermediaries
in period 1. This eect exerts downward pressures on the expected future rates, reB2 and
reL2: Since
LB =
1
(1 + rB1)(1 + reB2)  1
(36)
this raises, given rB1, the demand for leverage by Bs. This higher demand for leverage raises
rB1 and this reduces the demand for leverage by Bs. However, as suggested by proposition 14
the rst eect always dominates implying that, ultimately, lower exante bailout uncertainty
perceived for period 1 induces a credit expansion already in period 0.
Clearly, the belief that government may repay the debt of some delinquent nancial
intermediaries creates a moral hazard problem. An important implication of Proposition 14
is that, by raising leverage in the economy, the perception of a more generous bailout policy
aggravates this problem and increases the likelihood and the severity of a potential nancial
crisis in period 1:
8.2 The impact of a temporary expansionary monetary policy
Within the context of the model a temporary expansionary monetary in period 0, policy
takes the form of a decrease in rf holding the borrowing rate expected for period 1; r
e
B2,
constant. The following proposition summarizes the impact of such a policy.
Proposition 15: A temporary decrease in the risk free policy rate, rf1; leads to a decrease
in both rB1 and rL1, and to an increase in leverage within both the nancial and the real
sectors (both LF (rB1; rL1) and L

B go up).
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When the period's 0 decrease in rf is permanent in the sense that it is expected to last also
through period 1 there is a further expansionary eect on the equilibrium volume of credit in
period 0: This eect operates through the same channels that an increase in 0 does. That
is, by reducing expected future rates, a lower expected future policy rate induces further
increases in the current volume of credit.
Broad interpretation of propositions 14 and 15: The subprime crisis counterpart
of period 0 in the model can be thought of as the buildup phase of the crisis. During this
phase market participants believed that the set of bailout probabilities with positive mass is
concentrated in a range with relatively high values of p. In addition, monetary policy was
loose by historical standards. Propositions 14 and 15 imply that both factors contributed
to the exante expansion of credit and to a real investment boom, making the system more
fragile to a sudden downward revision of perceptions about the likelihood of governmental
bailouts.28
9 Should government commit exante to a particular
bailout policy?
This section briey reects on the desirability (or undesirability) of bailout uncertainty. The
discussion in the previous section suggests that higher exante bailout uncertainty reduces the
volume of leverage and with it the level of real investment activity undertaken by borrowers.
The discussion in section 7 suggests that higher expost (after long term investment decisions
have been made) bailout uncertainty leads to higher levels of defaults and, in parallel, to
the destruction of existing investments by borrowers. The rst result opens the door for
the conclusion that some exante bailout uncertainty may be desirable since it keeps the
28It is noteworthy that within four to six months after the panic that followed Lehman's collapse CDS
spreads returned to subsantially lower levels. In terms of the model this is consistent with the view that, after
the TARP legislation was nally passed in early October 2008 and actually implemented in the following
months along with a dramatic expansion of monetary policy, bailout uncertainty receded in the sense that
the worst bailout probability with positive mass increased relatively to its level during the second half of
September 2008. The broader implication of this observation is that government actions can reduce as well
as increase bailout uncertainty.
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buildup of credit in check thereby alleviating potential future burdens on taxpayers as well
as potential defaults. But, in the spirit of the "lender of last resort" view, the second result
provides an argument for reducing bailout uncertainty expost in order to avoid bankrupcies
and the associated destruction of capital and economic activity It would therefore appear at
rst blush that, although higher bailout uncertainty is disruptive expost, it may be desirable
exante.
This begs the question of whether the optimal level of bailout uncertainty (or ambiguity)
may be internal. Although answering this important question is largely beyond the scope
of this paper it is briey touched upon at the end of this section. But the analysis in the
two previous sections does implies that, whatever the optimal level of bailout uncertainty,
over time changes in both directions in this level are inecient. This statement is based
on the view that welfare in the economy is higher the lower is the volume of investments
destroyed or missed due to errors in evaluating bailout uncertainty. As shown in the previous
two sections an increase in bailout uncertainty between periods 0 and 1 leads to period's 0
investment and leverage levels in excess of what those levels would have been in the absence
of the change, and consequently to defaults and capital destruction in period 1 in excess of
their levels in the absence of the change. Hence, given the initial level of bailout uncertainty,
welfare is higher in the absence of the change. When bailout uncertainty goes down period's
0 investments by borrowers are lower than what they would have been, had they known in
advance that period's 1 bailout uncertainty will be lower and the level of investments in the
economy is suboptimally low.
We now come back to the question regarding the desirability of bailout uncertainty. One
way to reduce this uncertainty is to have government commit to a particular probability
of bailout, pc: Such a policy, if successful, may eliminate multiple priors beliefs from the
minds of individuals. But whether this encourages or discourages leverage exante depends
on whether pc is higher or lower than the minimal multiple priors entertained by individuals
prior to the commitment. Be that as it may one advantage of such a commitment is that it
makes government's control over the public's beliefs tighter.
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10 Concluding remarks
A major result of our analysis is that the larger the change in bailout uncertainty the stronger
the pre-crisis buildup and the deeper the ensuing crisis. The detailed mechanics of this result
can be appreciated by thinking of period 0 as the pre-crisis phase during which the worst
scenario perceived likelihood of bailout is high and monetary policy relatively loose leading
to credit expansion and to an investment boom. Taylor (2009) argues that loose monetary
policy caused, prolonged and worsened the nancial crisis. Period 1 can be thought of as the
phase in which, due to the arrival of some major public signal | like not rescuing Lehman
| nancial market operators adjust their worst scenario perceptions about the likelihood of
bailout downward. By Proposition 12 this adjustment induces a general increase in market
interest rates, a rise in the proportion of insolvent borrowers along with the destruction of
real investments and, for some realizations of real returns, a complete drying up of short
term credit markets { or in Caballero's (2010) terminology { a sudden nancial arrest.
By Proposition 14 the pre-crisis bubbly credit boom is larger the larger 0 . By Proposi-
tion 12 the magnitudes of deleveraging and of insolvencies (real and nancial) is larger the
lower is 1 . Since it measures the extent to which the set of possible bailout distributions
widened between periods 0 and 1 the dierence 0   1 is a natural proxy for the increase
in bailout uncertainty. Combining this proxy with Propositions 14 and 12 yields the conclu-
sion that higher changes in bailout uncertainty are associated with larger pre-crisis bubbles
as well as with higher levels of insolvencies and destruction of real economic activity when
the bubble bursts. The crucial variable through which those eects operate is leverage. It
expands more during periods of optimism about the likelihood of bailouts but, by the same
token, it shrinks more violently during periods of pessimism about the likelihood of bailouts.
Given 1 the deleveraging process during period 1 involves a larger volume of insolvencies
the larger is 0 . The reason is that a larger 0 raises the exante leverage buildup in com-
parison to what market operators would have engaged in, had they known already in period
0 that the probability of bailout in period 1 will drop to 1 . The larger this "excessive"
credit buildup, the larger the expost volume of insolvencies in the real economy.
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The paper shows that the perceptions of market participants about systemic risks as
captured by the covariance between the returns on dierent loans within the fully diversied
portofolio of lenders is systematically related to bailout uncertainty. In particular, even
within a fully rational world, a higher level of bailout uncertainty is associated with a higher
level of perceived systemic risks (propositions 10 and 12).
Somewhat analogously to Diamond and Dybvig (1983) (DD in the sequel) classic model
of bank runs, a main objective of this paper was to identify circumstances that trigger a
nancial crisis. A main result of the DD framework is that deposit insurance eliminates runs
on the banks. Although there is an analogy between the role of deposit insurance in DD
and bailouts in our framework, a crucial dierence between them is that, up to a given limit,
deposit insurance is backed by the exante certainty of a legal act while the availability (and
scope) of the generalized bailouts considered here is shrouded in uncertainty and is likely
to remain in this state also in the future. Besides other obvious dierences two additional
dierence worth emphasizing are: (i) In DD liquidity shocks are exogenous while here they
are related to an increase in uncertainty due to the arrival of new information about "black
swan" events. (ii) Our framework features a more detailed picture of the nancial sector
and is designed to make statements about the impact of monetary policy on leverage and
the economy.
Reinhart and Rogo (2009) present broad evidence supporting the view that private
nancial crises are often followed by substantial reductions in tax collections and defaults
on sovereign debt. Motivated by this ndings and some of the results in this paper we
speculate in what follows on an additional channel through which higher exante leverage
buildups possibly makes the economy more crisis prone when new information arrives. Higher
leverage raises the probability as well as the magnitude of potential defaults, and with it the
cost of potential bailouts. The more costly is a bailout to taxpayers the more reluctant is
government to engage in such bailouts. As a consequence, the higher is leverage, the higher
bailout uncertainty making beliefs more sensitive to news.
The punch line is that the sensitivity of expectations to various news becomes larger
the larger is leverage. In terms of the Gilboa-Schmeidler (1989) uncertainty framework this
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means that the range of bailout probability distributions entertained by individuals becomes
more sensitive to news. As a consequence, the same pessimistic new information about the
likelihood of bailout is more likely to puncture a bubble the higher is leverage.
39
References
[Akerlof and Shiller(2009)] Akerlof, G. A. and Shiller, R. J. (2009). Animal Spirits: How
Human Psychology Drives the Economy and Why it Matters for Global Capitalism.
Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford.
[Borio and Drehmann(2009)] Borio, C. and Drehmann, M. (2009). Assessing the risk of
banking crises - revisited. BIS Quarterly Review : 29{46.
[Brunner and Meltzer(1997)] Brunner, K. and Meltzer, A. (1997). Money and the Economy
Issues in Monetary Analysis . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[Caballero(2010)] Caballero, R. J. (2010). Sudden nancial arrest. IMF Economic Review
58: 6{36.
[Caballero and Krishnamurthy(2008)] Caballero, R. J. and Krishnamurthy, A. (2008). Col-
lective risk management in a ight to quality episode. Journal of Finance 63: 2195{2230.
[Cochrane and Zingales(2009)] Cochrane, J. H. and Zingales, L. (2009). Lehman and the
nancial crisis. The Wall Street Journal .
[Diamond and Dybvig(1983)] Diamond, D. W. and Dybvig, P. H. (1983). Bank runs, deposit
insurance, and liquidity. Journal of Political Economy 91: 401{19.
[Ellsberg(1961)] Ellsberg, D. (1961). Risk, ambiguity, and the Savage axioms. Quarterly
Journal of Economics 75.
[Gilboa and Schmeidler(1989)] Gilboa, I. and Schmeidler, D. (1989). Maxmin expected util-
ity with non-unique prior. Journal of Mathematical Economics 18: 141{153.
[Gilchrist and Zakrajsek(2011)] Gilchrist, S. and Zakrajsek, E. (2011). Credit spreads and
business cycle uctuations. NBER Working Paper number 17021.
[Izhakian and Izhakian(2010a)] Izhakian, Y. and Izhakian, Z. (2010a). Phantom probability.
Preprint at arXiv:0901.0902.
40
[Izhakian and Izhakian(2010b)] Izhakian, Y. and Izhakian, Z. (2010b). Decision making in
phantom spaces. Preprint at SSRN:1329366.
[Klibano et al.(2005)Klibano, Marinacci and Mukerji] Klibano, P., Marinacci, M. and
Mukerji, S. (2005). A smooth model of decision making under ambiguity. Econometrica
73: 1849{1892.
[Knight(1921)] Knight, F. M. (1921). Risk, Uncertainty and Prot . Boston: Houghton Mif-
in.
[Meltzer(2009)] Meltzer, A. H. (2009). Epilogue: The United States in the global nancial
crisis of 2007-9. Manuscript, Carnegie-Mellon University and the American Enterprise
Institute.
[Merton(1971)] Merton, R. C. (1971). Optimum consumption and portfolio rules in a
continuous-time model. Journal of Economic Theory 3: 373{413.
[Merton(1973)] Merton, R. C. (1973). An intertemporal capital asset pricing model. Econo-
metrica 41: 867{87.
[Reinhart and Rogo(2009)] Reinhart, C. and Rogo, K. (2009). This Time is Dierent:
Eight Centuries of Financial Folly . Princeton, NJ: Princeton Unioversity Press.
[Sargent(1987)] Sargent, T. J. (1987). Macroeconomic theory . Boston : Academic Press, 2nd
ed.
[Taleb(2007)] Taleb, N. N. (2007). The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable.
Random House Group.
[Taylor(2009)] Taylor, J. (2009). Getting O Track: How Government Actions and Inter-
ventions Caused, Prolonged, and Worsened the Financial Crisis . Hoover Institution
Press.
[Tobin(1969)] Tobin, J. (1969). A general equilibrium approach to monetary theory. Journal
of Money, Credit and Banking 1: 15{29.
41
A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
For regular borrowers, and given rB2 = r
e
B2; the condition in Equation (4) is identical to
the condition in Equation (3). But, by assumption 1a, the last condition is satised for all
LB  0. Hence, regular borrowers are solvent at any level of leverage. Since 2yq > 2y (2q   1)
this is afortiori true for lucky borrowers. The proof for unlucky borrowers follows by using
Equation (5) in solvency condition (4) and by rearranging. QED
Proof of Lemma 2
The proof of parts (i) and (ii) is obtained by substituting eYP =  2y and eYP = 0 respectively
into Equation (8) and by rearranging. The proof of part (iii) follows by inserting eYP = 2y
into Equation (8) and by utilizing Assumption 1. QED
Proof of Lemma 3
Part (i) is a direct consequence of Lemma 1. To prove part (ii) note that, since 1
2
< q < 1;
LLB < L
1
B < L
H
B : The ultimate payo of an UB is either 0 in case of expansion or  2y in case
of contraction. By Lemma 2, and since L1B < L
H
B ; this borrower is solvent in the rst case.
By Lemma 2, and since LLB < L
1
B; this borrower is insolvent in the second case. Part (iii) is
a direct consequence of Assumption 1 in conjunction with condition (7). QED
Proof of Proposition 1
The rst two default probabilities follow directly from Lemmas 1 through 3. The third
probability is derived by noting that, when leverage is larger than L1B default may occur in
period 1 if the borrower turns out to be unlucky (probability UB) and may also occur in
period 2 if he turns out to be a regular borrower and eYP =  2y (probability (1  )(1  q)2):
The last probability follows by noting that, in addition to the states in which he defaults in
the previous case, the borrower defaults also in the following two cases: (i) If he is a LB and
there is a contraction, (ii) If he is a regular borrower in and eYP = 0. QED
Proof of Proposition 2
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To show that LHB is the optimal level of leverage it suces to establish that
V (LHB ) > V (L
1
B) > V (L
L
B) > V (LB = 0);
V (LHB ) > V (L
m
B ):
The proof is implemented by using Equation (12) to form explicit expressions for the dif-
ferences V (LLB)   V (LB = 0); V (L1B)   V (LLB); V (LHB )   V (L1B); V (LmB )   V (LHB ) and by
showing that they are all positive.
(i) V (LLB)  V (LB = 0) = q2(2y   reB)LLB   2q(1  q)reBLLB:
Assumption 1 and q suciently close to one imply that this dierence is positive.
(ii) V (L1B)  V (LLB) = fq2(2y   reB)  2q(1  q)reBg (L1B   LLB)  (1  q)2PBL1B:
Since (L1B   LLB) > 0 this expression is positive for q suciently close to one.
(iii) Letting LB approach q from below and UB approach zero from above
V (LHB ) V (L1B) = q2(2y reB)(LHB L1B) 2q(1 q)(1 reBL1B) (1 q)2PB

(1  q)LHB   L1B

:
Since (LHB   L1B) > 0 this expression is positive for q suciently close to one.
(iv) The condition V (LmB )  V (LHB ) > 0 is equivalent to
[[(1  )2q(1  q) + LB(1  q)]PB   [LBq + (1  )q2] (2y   reB)]
 
LmB   LHB

> 0:
Since (LHB   L1B) > 0 this expression is positive if and only if PB > P cB: QED
Proof of Proposition 3
The proof is a direct consequence of the fact that all three types of agents are risk averse and
that leverage levels are positive. Consequently, nancial intermediaries require a markup
over their leverage costs as compensation for investing in risky loans to investors. As a
consequence rB > rL: Similarly, lenders demand a risk premium when they invest in risky
loans to nancial intermediaries rather than in risk free asset. Hence, rL  rf :29 . QED
Proof of Proposition 4
By construction, since rf < rL, an F with positive short term leverage and some fraction of
the portfolio invested in risk free assets can increase his prots by reducing both short term
29As elaborated later in the general equilibrium section, the equality sign is allowed to accommodate a
special case in which, due to full diversication, lenders face no risk in period 0.
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leverage and, in parallel, the investment in risk free assets. Consequently, a conguration
with both positive leverage and some investment in risk free assets cannot be a nancial
intermediary's optimum. Hence zf = 0. QED
Proof of Proposition 5
Equation (19) is obtained by maximizing the expected utility of F with respect to LF for
zf = 0 under the assumption that F's optimal leverage is above L
c
F . Conditions (ii) and (iii)
are needed to rule out the possibility that optimal leverage is at LcF or at zero. To derive
those conditions let LmF be any leverage level above L
c
F and let.
EVF [LF ]  Eu [WF (LF )] : (37)
Then necessary conditions for the optimal level of leverage to be above LcF are
EVF [L
m
F ] > EVF [LF = 0]
EVF [L
m
F ] > EVF [L
c
F ] (38)
Conditions (i) and (ii) are obtained by using equations (13) and (16) to express F's utility
in terms of the appropriate levels of leverage, substituting the resulting expression into
Equation (38) and by rearranging. To complete the proof it remains to show that, when
(2t=1t) is suciently small, EVF [L
c
F ] > EVF [L
s
F ] for any 0 < L
s
F < L
c
F establishing (since
EVF [L
m
F ] > EVF [L
c
F ]) that EVF [L
m
F ] is also larger than EVF [L
s
F ] : When (2t=1t) is small
the only two terms that could potentially make EVF [L
s
F ] larger than EVF [L
c
F ] involve 2t,
while the terms that operate to reverse this inequality involve 1t: In the extreme case,
(2t=1t) = 0; it is unambiguously the case that EVF [L
c
F ] > EVF [L
s
F ] : By continuity this is
also the case for (2t=1t) positive but suciently small. QED
Proof of Proposition 6
The condition in Equation (17) implies that, when LFt > L
c
F ; F is solvent if and only if both
of his debtors are solvent. Recalling that rBt  rLt > 0 and inspecting Equation (19) reveals
that LFt is a monotonically increasing function of  and that it tends to innity when  tends
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to zero. It follows that, for suciently small but positive values of , LFt > L
c
F implying
that F is solvent if and only if both of his borrowers are solvent. QED
Proof of Proposition 7
The rst three parts follow directly from inspection of Equation (19). Part (iv) is established
by dierentiating this equation with respect to rBt. QED
Proof of Proposition 8
Calculation of the expected value is relatively straightforward. Derivation of the variance
utilizes the fact that the variance of a fully diversied risky portfolio composed of (equally
weighted) innitely many identically distributed assets is equal to the covariance between
any two assets within the portfolio. Calculation of this covariance simplies the derivation of
an explicit expression for V ar

f eRL2g but still involves some messy intermediate algebra.
Details to be completed.
The expression for L's portfolio variance in Proposition 8 is obtained by using the joint
distribution of (erLi; erLj) in the denition of the covariance between erLi and erLj and by
simplifying using the Mathematica software. QED
Proof of Proposition 9
Recall that, to keep notation simple, we use the symbol eRL to denote the gross (one plus)
return on a portfolio that consist of an innite number of loans, ferLg, and eRf = 1 + rf is
the gross risk free rate. A typical lender's maximization problem is given by
max
zL
E
h
u

zL( eRL  Rf ) +Rfi ;
where u () stands for the utility function. The rst order condition implies
E
h
u0

zL( eRL  Rf ) +Rf ( eRL  Rf )i = 0:
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Taking a Taylor approximation of the marginal utility with respect to eRL around Rf yields
E
h
u0 (Rf )
 eRL  Rfi+ E hu00 (Rf ) eRL  Rf eRL  Rf zLi = 0:
For a suciently small risk premium
zL =  
u0 (Rf )

E eRL  Rf
u00 (Rf )E
 eRL  Rf2 =

E eRL  Rf
 u00(Rf)
u0(Rf)
V ar
 eRL ;
but for constant absolute risk aversion, u (x) =  e x, the coecient of absolute risk aversion
is  u
00(Rf)
u0(Rf)
= , and thus zL =
E(f1+erLg) (1+rf)
V ar(ferLg) : QED
Proof of Proposition 10
Part (i) follows immediately form Equation (22).
Part (ii) The rst derivative of V ar

f eRL2g with respect to p is
@V ar

f eRL2g
@q
=  2 (1  p) (1  q) (1  q1)2
 
q + 2qq1 + q
2
1

;
which is negative since p; q 2 [0; 1] are probabilities.
Part (iii) follows immediately form Equation (22). QED
Proof of Proposition 11
Writing Equation (26) as
zL (; rL; q; q1) =
E

f eRLg  (1 + rf )
V ar

f eRLg =
1 (1 + erL)  (1 + rf )
2 (1 + erL)2 = 12y;
where 1 and 2 are determined by equations (22) and (??), respectively. Dierentiating y
with respect to erL yields
@y
@erL =  1 (1 + erL) + 2 (1 + rf )(1 + erL)3 :
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Since it is a probability 1 2 [0; ; 1]. Hence, the derivative is positive for 2(1+rf) 11 
1 + 2rf  erL: QED
Proof of Proposition 12
Part (i) is an immediate consequence of proposition 10.
Part (ii): Dierentiating equations (32) and (33) totally with respect to  yields
0 = (1  UB)MF

@LF
@rB
drB2
d
+
@LF
@rL
drL2
d

; (39)
(1  UB)2MF

@LF2
@rB
drB2
d
+
@LF2
@rL
drL2
d

= (1 + rL1)ML

@zL2
@rL
drB2
d
+
@zL2
@

: (40)
Solving this two equations system for drB2
d
and drL2
d
drB2
d
=  
@LF2
@rL
@LF2
@rB
@zL2
@
@zL2
@rL
; (41)
drL2
d
=  
@zL2
@
@zL2
@rL
: (42)
By Proposition 7,
@LL2
@rB
> 0 and
@LL2
@rL
< 0. By Proposition 10 and 11,
@zL2
@
and
@zL2
@rL
are
both positive. Utilization of those sign restrictions in equations (41) and (42) implies that
the general equilibrium eects of a surprise decrease in  is to raise both rB2 and rL2 above
what those rates had been expected to be in period 0 (reB2 and r
e
L2).
Part (iii): Although Assumption 2 requires that E
heYP j I1 \RBi = 2y([q + q1   1] > reB 
(1 + rB1)(1 + r
e
B2)  1 the condition in part (ii) of this proposition implies that it is violated
when reB is replaced with rB; or in explicit notation
E
heYP j I1 \RBi = 2y([q + q1   1] < rB  (1 + rB1)(1 + rB2)  1: (43)
By equation (4) adapted to actual period's 1 information a RB is solvent in period 1 if and
47
only if
LB(1 + r
e
B)  (1 + LB)
h
1 + E
heYP j I1 \RBii ;
which is equivalent to
LB  1 + 2y([q + q1   1]
rB   2y([q + q1   1]  L
1
B(rB1); (44)
where the denominator is positive by condition (43). It follows that regular borrowers do
not get renancing in period 1 if
LB = L
H
B =
1
reB
>
1 + 2y([q + q1   1]
rB   2y([q + q1   1]  L
1
B(rB1): (45)
Rearrangement of this inequality reveals that it is equivalent to the condition in part (ii) of
the proposition establishing that RB default. Given that RB default under rB2 UB default
afortiori.
Part (iv) When rB2 increases suciently beyond the bound in part (ii) even LB are denied
access to credit inducing a total drying up of renancing to borrowers. QED
Proof of proposition 13
Part (i): The banking spread in period 2 is
S2  rB2   rL2: (46)
Dierentiating the spread totally with respect to 1
dS2
d1
=
drB2
d1
  drL2
d1
=
 
1  j
@LF2
@rL
j
@LF2
@rB
!
j drL2
d1
j (47)
where the second equality follows by using equations (41) and (42). Since
@LF2
@rB
> 0; dS2
d1
is
negative or positive depending on whether j @LF2
@rL
j is larger or smaller than @LF2
@rB
. Hence
an increase in bailout uncertainty (a decrease in 1) raises the spread in the rst case and
reduces it in the second.
Part (ii): Examination of the expression for LF2 in proposition 5 reveals that j @L

F2
@rL
jand
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@LF2
@rB
may dier only because of the second term on the right hand side of equation (19).
Using this fact along with that equation yields after some algebra
j @L

F2
@rL
j  @L

F2
@rB
=
rB2   rL2
S22
:
Since rB2   rL2 > 0; j @L

F2
@rL
j> @LF2
@rB
implying, by part (i), that an increase in bailout
uncertainty raises the banking spread. QED
Proof of proposition 14
The 3 equations system in (29), (30) and (31) determines reB2, r
e
L2 and rB1 as functions of
0 and other exogenous variables. Dierentiating this system totally with respect to 0 and
using the total dierential of the rst of those equations to express drB1
d0
in terms of drB2
d0
yields
drB1
d0
=
drB1
dreB2
dreB2
d0
(48)
where
drB1
dreB2
=  
MB
@LB
@reB
MB
@LB
@rB
 MF @L

F1
@rB
: (49)
Equation (36) implies
@LB
@reB
< 0;
@LB
@rB
< 0 and, from proposition 7
@LF1
@rB
> 0: Hence drB1
dreB2
is
negative implying that drB1
d0
and drB2
d0
have opposite signs. Dierentiating LB totally with
respect to 0 and using equation (49)
dLB
d0
=
8<:  MF
@LF1
@rB
@LB
@reB
MB
@LB
@rB
 MF @L

F1
@rB
9=; dreB2d0 : (50)
Inspection reveals that the term in curly brackets on the right hand side of this equation is
negative implying that
Si gn

dLB
d0

=   Si gn

dreB2
d0

(51)
Substituting equation (49) into the total dierentials of equations (30) and (31) and
rearranging yields the following two equations system for the determination of
dreB2
d0
and of
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dreL2
d0
:
MF (1  UB)2@L
e
F2
@reB
dreB2
d0
+

MF (1  UB)2@L
e
F2
@reL
 ML(1 + rf1)@z
e
L2
@reL

dreL2
d0
= ML(1 + rf1)
@zeL2
@08<: MF (1  UB)

WrB1
drB1
dreB2
+
@LeF2
@reB

 MB

@LB
@rB
drB1
dreB2
+
@LB
@reB

9=; dreB2d0 +MF (1  UB)@L
e
F2
@reL
dreL2
d0
= 0 (52)
where LeF2 and z
e
L2 are the model consistent expectations of those variables given the in-
formation set of period 1 and WrB1 is the derivative of f1 + rB1 + (rB1   rL1)LF (rB1; rL1)g
with respect to rB1: To evaluate the signs of
dreB2
d0
and of
dreL2
d0
it is convenient to utilize the
following claim that is proved later.
Claim: Provided  is positive but close to zero, PF < 1 and (1  UB)2 (1 + rB1   rL1) > 1
the impact of a general equilibrium change in reB2 on rB1 (i.e.
drB1
dreB2
) is relatively small.
Using the claim in equations (52) and solving for
dreB2
d0
and
dreL2
d0
dreB2
d0
=
@LeF2
@reL
@zeL2
@0
@zeL2
@reL
@LeF2
@reB
< 0
dreL2
d0
=  

MF (1  UB)@L
e
F2
@reB
 MB @L

B
@reB

@zeL2
@0
MF (1  UB)@z
e
L2
@reL
@LeF2
@reB
< 0: (53)
The negative signs of those expressions follow by noting that, from proposition 7,
@LeF2
@reB
> 0;
@LeF2
@reL
< 0; from propositions 10 and 11
@zeL2
@0
and
@zeL2
@reL
are both positive; and from equation
(36)
@LB
@reB
< 0. This establishes part (ii). The fact that LB is higher follows from equation
(51) in conjunction with the fact that
dreB2
d0
< 0: This implies via equations (30) and (29)
that LF (rB1; rL1) and zL1 are also higher when 0 is higher establishing part (i). Part (iii)
follows from part (ii) and equation (48) by noting that drB1
dreB2
is negative. This completes the
proof of the proposition provided the claim is true.
Proof of claim: Noting that 11 = (1 UB)2 and dierentiating equation (19) with respect
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to rB1
@LF1
@rB
=
1  


1
PF
(1  UB)2
1  (1  UB)2 (rB1   rL1)
1 2
 1

+
1 + rL1
(rB1   rL1)2 :
Under the conditions of the proposition the term in curly parenthesis on the right hand side
of this equation is larger than one. Consequently, when  tends to zero from above
@LF1
@rB
tends to innity implying, by equation (49), that drB1
dreB2
becomes very small. This completes
the proof of the claim and of the proposition.
QED
Proof of Proposition 15
Translated into the model's timing framework a temporary decrease in the risk free rate
means that rf1 goes down without any change in r
e
f2: The decrease in rf1 triggers, via equa-
tion (27), a decrease in rL1; and by part (ii) of proposition 7, an increase in L

F (rB1; rL1): This
increase translates through equilibrium condition (28) into an increase in zL1: Furthermore,
the increase in LF (rB1; rL1) induces, via equilibrium condition (29), a decrease in rB1 and
an increase in LB: QED
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